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A. COURT DECISIONS 
§16.1. Transportation agencies: Service. General Laws, Chapter 
159A, Section I, provides that no certificate of public convenience and 
necessity may be issued by the Department of Public Utilities until 
the applicant has first obtained a license from each municipality 
through which the carrier proposes to operate. Local licenses expire 
at the end of three years unless a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity has been issued within the three-year period.1 
The Plymouth and Brockton Street Railway Company (P Be B) ob-
tained licenses from the towns of Barnstable, Sandwich, and Bourne on 
February 17, 19, and 21, 1958, respectively. By petition filed with the 
Department on September 28, 1960, it sought a certificate to operate 
between Hyannis and Sagamore, which route, combined with its then 
existing authority, would permit it to provide service between Boston, 
Plymouth, and Hyannis. Public hearings were held on December 12, 
1960, and January 6, 1961, at which Almeida Bus Lines, Inc. 
(Almeida), a carrier which had authority between Boston and Hyannis 
via Middleboro, appeared in opposition. On January 4, 1961, Al-
meida petitioned for a certificate to operate between Hyannis and 
Boston over the Hyannis-Sagamore-Boston route, and at a public hear-
ing held on March 16, 1961, P Be B appeared in opposition. 
On May 19, 1961, the Department issued an order in each case 
granting the authority sought.2 It was apparent on this record that 
the local licenses issued to P Be B had expired before the May 19 
order. On June 7, 1961, the Department issued an order that "to 
prevent a failure of justice" the certificate to P Be B should bear a date 
as of February 1, 1961.8 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Department had author-
ity to issue a nunc pro tunc order, a power which the courts have 
under statutes that are declaratory of the common law.' The reason 
HERBERT BAER is Counsel of the Department of Public Utilities and a member of 
the firm of Maloney, Williams, Baer, and Doukas, Boston. 
§16.l. 1 G.L., c. 159A, §4. 
2 Plymouth & Brockton St. Ry. Co., D.P.U. 18419 (May, 1961); Almeida Bus Lines, 
Inc., D.P.U. 18499 (May, 1961). 
8 Plymouth & Brockton St. Ry. Co., D.P.U. 13419-A (June, 1961). 
'Almeida Bus Lines, Inc. v. Department of Public Utilities, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
55,2011 N.E.2d 556, also noted in §13.11 supra. 
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for the power applied equally well to administrative bodies, acting 
in their quasi-judicial capacity, as to courts. And the circumstances 
of this case presented one of the traditional situations in which the 
power has been invoked - where rights lapse owing to the expiration 
of time while a matter is under deliberation. P & B had filed a timely 
petition and had done all it could by January 6, 1961. The delay in 
the decision after the close of the hearing was entirely in the discre-
tion of the Department. 
The Court also rejected the argument that Almeida was entitled 
to a new notice and hearing prior to the June 7 order. The latter 
order was not based on any additional facts or change of circum-
stance. It merely accomplished what the Department had intended 
in the first place, and the holding of Fortier v. Department ot Public 
Utilities5 governed the question. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the decision is that it is the 
first judicial affirmation by this Court of the principle, long assumed, 
that the Department has the power to authorize service over the same 
route by two carriers. The Department had made detailed findings 
that service by P & B was required by the public convenience and 
necessity, among which were the superior service offered; many pas-
sengers already drove to Sagamore to connect with P & B; service 
would become available between Plymouth and Hyannis; and there 
were enough patrons between these points to support service by two 
carriers. On the basis of these facts, the Court found that there was 
substantial evidence to support the decision of the Department and 
that it could depart from its established policy of protecting fran-
chised carriers from encroachment by other carriers. 
§16.2. Transportation agencies: Power to regulate. Woods Hole, 
Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority v. Baxter1 
arose under Section 5 of the Acts of 1960, Chapter 701, which pro-
hibits the operation of a vessel of more than 100 gross tons for car-
riage for hire without consent of the Authority. The Supreme 
Judicial Court's construction of the term "for hire" and "gross tons" 
are applicable to regulated carriers generally, since these exact terms 
appear in the statute regulating common carriers.2 The defendant 
had sought to avoid the statute by purchasing goods in his own name 
on the mainland and selling them on the island. On the basis of 
evidence that he had no inventory or other investment except in 
transportation facilities, that he advertised as a carrier, and that he 
charged prices calculated on the basis of the cost of goods plus a 
transportation charge, the Court found that the "sales" were merely 
a subterfuge and that the defendant was really carrying property for 
hire. 
A "gross ton" in the measurement of vessels is one hundred cubic 
5M2 Mass. 728, 175 N.E.2d 495 (1961), noted in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.2. 
§16.2. 1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 881, 208 N.E.2d 218. 
2 C.L., c. 159, §12. 
2
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feet. The United States Bureau of Customs maintains a register of 
all ships subject to its jurisdiction and certifies each vessel according 
to gross tonnage. The plaintiff argued that the Court should not 
accept this certification as conclusive but should hear evidence of vol-
ume and make its own determination of gross tonnage. The Court 
held that as a matter of statutory interpretation the legislature in-
tended that the phrase refer to the tonnage as shown on the federal 
registry. This interpretation makes the statute easily administrable, 
since there exists a public, impartial, and definitive determination of 
this issue in the event any dispute arises. 
§16.3. Electric utilities: Rates. The city of Holyoke is authorized 
by statute to manufacture and sell gas, electricity, and steam.1 The 
Holyoke Water Power Company is authorized to sell electricity in 
the city to customers purchasing in lots of 100 horsepower or more. 
The city and the company are thus in competition to obtain the busi-
ness from large customers within Holyoke. In March, 1963, the city 
commenced offering a discount of 5 per cent to those of its steam 
customers that also purchased their electricity from the city. 
In Holyoke Water Power Co. v. City of Holyoke2 the company, 
which is a steam customer of the city, brought a bill seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the discount was an unlawful discrimination by 
the city against steam customers who did not purchase electricity from 
the city. The trial court sustained the city's plea in bar to the effect 
that the company was required to file a complaint with the Depart-
ment prior to bringing action in the courts. The company appealed. 
The Department does not have general supervision over municipal 
lighting plants.s With respect to the sale of electricity within the bound-
aries of a municipality,4 the only statutory power of the Department 
over rates is contained in Section 58 of General Laws, Chapter 164. No 
prices may be fixed, without the approval of the Department, below 
"production cost" nor above a level which yields 8 per cent on the 
"cost of plant," as those terms may be defined from time to time -by 
the Department. It has always been assumed that within these maxi-
mum and minimum limitations, municipal light boards could fix 
prices independently of the Department and, in fact, the Department 
has not had occasion to promulgate general definitions of these terms. 
The holding in this case, that resort must first be had by the com-
pany to the Department, casts doubt on the traditional interpretation. 
On the one hand, the decision implied that the Department does have 
some power to act in this instance. On the other hand, the Court 
afforded no clue as to the extent of this authority. The reasoning of 
the Court offered no help in this connection and, indeed, its sound-
ness, as a matter of statutory construction, may be questioned. In 
brief, the basis for the decision was that, since the Department has 
§16.!I. 1 Acts of 1947, c. 289, §I; Acts of 1922, c. 173. 
2 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1075, 208 N.E.2d 801. 
S Compare G.L., c. 164, §76, granting supervisory authority over private companies. 
4Id. §!l4. 
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various regulatory powers over municipal lighting boards in addition 
to those stated in Section 58, it must have powers over rates not con-
tained in Section 58. The difficulty with this reasoning is that the 
other powers to which reference is made either have no possible con-
nection with the setting of rates5 or are perfectly consistent with the 
limited powers set forth in Section 58.6 
Examples of the former type of powers are those which enable the 
Department to act as an arbiter of the price to be paid by a munici-
pality (a) to a private company, if tI;1e former elects to purchase the 
plaut of the latter, or (b) to a private company for power. An example 
of the latter type of authority is the requirement that the municipal 
light board file an annual report with the Department.7 This annual 
report would be necessary if the Department's powers over rates were 
limited to determining whether the rates were outside the range of 
the minimum or maximum stated in Section 58. It does not support 
an inference that the powers of the Department are broader than 
those stated in Section 58. Similarly, Section 69, upon which the Court 
relied heavily, is a power which is necessary to enable the Department 
to prevent municipalities from selling below costS or at a return above 
8 per cent. It carries no implication that there are any additional 
limitations on the power of the municipality to fix rates. 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 
§16.4. Water companies: Rates. Wannacomet Water Co. v. De-
partment of Public Utilities l affirmed a decision of the Department 
which had been based in part on a finding that the company's depreci-
ation reserve had been understated.2 The finding was based on the cal-
culations of a company witness, and the Supreme Judicial Court noted 
that the calculations might have included depreciation based on plant 
that had already been retired. The issue was finally resolved by allow-
ing the company to add back to its plant the amounts credited to 
the plant account, made in lieu of depreciation in the period 1915-
1922, and calculating the depreciation reserve by the same method 
used by its witness in the earlier proceeding. The result was an in-
crease of $60,197 in the depreciation reserve instead of $76,000 as 
previously ordered.3 
§16.5. Railroads: Service. The Department reheard the case re-
manded in New York Central Railroad Co. v. Department of Public 
Ii Id. §§37, 43,47,57. 
6 Id. §§54, 59, 60. 
7 Id. §63. 
S Re Trustee of The Naushon Trust, D.P.U. 11737 Gune, 1956). 
§16.4. l346 Mass. 453, 194 N.E.2d 109 (1963), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§16.1. 
2 Wannacomet Water Co., D.P.U. 13525 Gune, 1962). 
3 Wannacomet Water Co., D.P.U. 13525·A (Dec. 1964). 
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Utilities1 and on the basis of additional evidence advanced by the 
railroad, showing the relative economy of rail over road transportation 
of new automobiles and the capacity use then being made of the 
industrially zoned land adjacent to the towns, held that the use of 
the towns for a marshaling yard was reasonably necessary for the 
convenience and welfare of the public.2 
§16.6. Electric utilities: Rates. In a case similar to Cambridge 
Electric Light Company,l the Department considered the complaint 
of the Metropolitan District Commission that the charges of Boston 
Edison Company to it for street lighting were excessive.2 The filed 
rate under which the MDC had been charged was based on company 
ownership of all street lighting equipment, but a portion of the equip-
ment had been supplied by the MDC. The company offered an 
allowance from the filed rate based on the annual cost to the MDC of 
supplying its portion of the equipment. The MDC contended, and 
the Department agreed, that the allowance should be based on the 
annual saving to the company resulting from the MDC ownership. 
On this basis the MDC was found to be entitled to an additional 
allowance for personal property taxes on the equipment, which are 
a saving to the company but not a cost to the MDC, and for the 
excess of cost of money to the company over the cost of money to 
the MDC. 
§16.7. Gas companies: Securities. In Boston Gas Company,! the 
Department allowed an exemption from the competitive bidding 
requirements of General Laws, Chapter 164, Section 15, for an issue 
of $30,000,000 of bonds, doubtless the largest single issue for which 
an exemption has been granted by the Department. It was persuaded 
that, because the company had not had bonds in the hands of the 
public for over 30 years and had not received a rating on its bonds, 
an intensive effort to acquaint the investing community with the 
company, which is practical in a negotiated and not a competitively 
bid sale, would result in a lower cost of money to the company. Never-
theless, as a safeguard, approval was granted subject to a later review 
by the Department after the interest rate had been set but before sale.2 
In Highwood Water Co.S the Department was faced with conflicting 
elements of public interest. The company sought authority to issue 
securities to finance construction of certain facilities that would be 
adequate to serve a substantial increase in customers expected in 
future years. Economies of larger scale construction indicated that 
§16.5. 1347 Mass. 586, 199 N.E.2d 319 (1964), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §§14.l0, 16.3. 
2 D.P.U. 14348·C Gan. 1965). 
§16.6. 1 D.P.U. 14134 (April, 1964), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.4. 
2 Boston Edison Co., D.P.U. 14132 (Sept. 1964). 
§16.7. 1 Re Boston Gas Co., D.P.U. 14805 (March, 1965). 
2 Re Boston Gas Co., D.P.U. 14805-A (May, 1965). 
s D.P.U. 14705 (April, 1965). 
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over the long run investment per customer would be less than if the 
same expansion were financed on a piecemeal basis. In the short run, 
investment per customer would be unduly high, however, if the exist-
ing customers were to carry the full cost of supporting this invest-
ment. Rather than disapprove the issue as not reasonably necessary, 
the Department approved the issue but reserved the right in any fu-
ture rate proceeding to determine an equitable rate base on the basis 
of the proportion of the total plant then being utilized. 
§16.8. Commercial motor vehicles: Rates. Rates for motor car-
riage of petroleum products are subject to a minimum rate order 
which applies to all carriers.1 In In re P. B. Mutrie Transportation, 
Inc.,2 the Department modified this order, which fixes minimum rates 
based on a rate per gallon for various mileages and sizes of vehicles. 
Following a decision of the Interstate Commerce CommissionS the De-
partment held that where a particular vehicle is devoted to the exclu-
sive use of one shipper for a period of at least thirteen weeks, it will 
permit rates based on hours of use and miles operated. Such rates are 
justified because of the cost reduction caused by the elimination of idle 
time, the cost of which, under the minimum rate order, is borne by the 
carrier. 
C. LEGISLATION 
§16.9 Water companies: Service. As residential home building 
has continued to boom, developers have found it necessary to move 
into previously rural areas for available land. Often such land is a 
great distance from established water supply systems. Not uncom-
monly, the developer has installed a system of wells, pumps, and mains 
in the course of land development. Unfortunately, in many cases these 
installations are of poor quality, which comes to light only after the 
land has been sold and houses built. Since the developer at that time 
has little remaining financial interest in the land, his incentive to 
improve the system is absent, and revenue from the sale of water at 
reasonable rates is usually insufficient to finance the substantial im-
provements required. Often the Department of Public Utilities is 
powerless to insure an adequate water supply when the owner may 
elect to go out of business rather than finance the necessary expendi-
ture. The magnitude of the problem was not fully disclosed until the 
amendment of General Laws, Chapter 165, Section I, by Acts of 1962, 
Chapter 154, which brought under Department regulation companies 
having mains in private as well as public ways. 
Acts of 1965, Chapter 385, seeks to prevent further occurrences of 
poor quality and inadequate water systems by requiring examination 
of the systems, prior to construction, by both the Departments of 
§16.8. 1 Re New England Motor Rate Bureau, Inc., et al., D.P.U. 12778 (April, 
1959). 
2 D.P.U. 14622 (Nov. 1964). 
8 In re Weekly Rates on Petroleum Products from Sparks, Nevada, 322 I.C.C. 541 
(April, 1964). 
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Public Utilities and Public Health. In order that this examination 
will take place at an early stage, building inspectors are no longer 
permitted to issue a building permit until the water supply system 
is constructed. 
§16.IO. School service carriage: Uncertificated carriers. In recent 
years the Department of Public Utilities has uncovered a number of 
instances of uncertificated carriers providing transportation for chil-
dren to and from school and .camp, which did not fall within the 
exception to Section IIA of Chapter 159A of the General Laws relat-
ing to transportation of school children under contracts with the 
school boards or authorities. These carriers were in many instances 
providing useful services which the certificated carriers in the area 
were unable to perform. Nevertheless, in most of these cases it would 
not have been in the public interest to grant an additional certificate 
for regular route common carriage. The result was a series of evasions 
of the requirements of law which the Department could control only 
through criminal complaints. By Acts of 1965, Chapter 537, the pro-
visions of Section IIA were amended to require any person providing 
"school service," which is defined as the transportation by an uncer-
tificated carrier of "children to and from school and summer day 
camp," to obtain authority from the Department. The statute makes 
the existing provisions relating to "special service" applicable to school 
service, except that school service permits, unlike special service per-
mits, may be issued to someone other than a holder of a charter 
license. The statute enables the Department to grant limited authority 
for services for which the public has a real need without interfering 
with the financial stability of existing certificated, regular route 
carriers. At the same time, by being able to grant these carriers a 
valuable franchise which may be lost if operations are not conducted 
according to law, the Department is enabled to exercise a more rigor-
ous control than was previously possible when its only remedy was by 
criminal complaint. 
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